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Abstract
Patent pools are cooperative agreements between several patent owners to bundle the sale
of their respective licenses. In this paper we analyze their consequences on the speed of the
innovation process. We adopt an ex ante p e r s p e c t i v ea n ds t u d yt h ei m p a c to fp o s s i b l ep o o l
formation on the incentives to innovate. Because participation in the creation of a pool acts as a
bonus reward on R&D activity, we show that a ﬁrm’s investment pattern is upward sloping over
time before pool formation, and decreases afterwards. The smaller the set of initial contributors,
the higher this eﬀect. A pool formation mechanism based on a proposal by the industry and
acceptance/refusal by the competition authority may induce overinvestment in early innovations
and lead to a delayed clearance date, that is suboptimal from an ex ante viewpoint.
Keywords: Licensing, R&D races, Innovation, Competition policy.
JEL: L51, O32.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
Patent pools are cooperative agreements among several patent owners to license in a package
a group of their respective patents to third parties.1 Although patent pools have long been
suspected of facilitating the implementation of anti-competitive behavior, recent communica-
tions by competition authorities recognize the potential virtues of patent pools as a means of
improving social welfare.2 In the Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Prop-
erty (1995), patent pools are declared to “provide procompetitive beneﬁts by integrating com-
plementary technologies, reducing transaction costs, clearing blocking positions, and avoiding
costly infringement litigation” (p. 28).3 In substance, by allowing one-stop shopping, the pool
gives access to more eﬃcient licensing. It can thus increase the private value of the constitutive
patents, and also increase social welfare by facilitating the diﬀusion of cost-reducing or demand-
enhancing technology. As a consequence of this more favorable position, patent pools re-emerged
in the recent years, mainly in high-technology sectors. Examples include MPEG-2 Digital Video
(1997), DVD-ROM and DVD-Video (1998, 1999), and 3G-Mobile Communications (2001).
1The U.S. Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property (1995), issued jointly by the Depart-
ment of Justice (DoJ) and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), evoke cross-licensing and pooling arrangements,
indistinguishably, as “agreements of two or more owners of diﬀerent items of intellectual property to license one
another or third parties” (p. 28). In more precise terms, in an address before the American Intellectual Property
Law Association, Klein (1997) deﬁnes cross-licensing as “an interchange of intellectual property rights between
two or more persons”, and patent pools as “an aggregation of intellectual property rights which are the subject
of cross-licensing, whether they are transferred directly by patentee to licensee or through some medium, such
as a joint venture, set up speciﬁcally to administer the patent pool” (p. 2, ftn 3). This distinction between
cross-licensing agreements and patent pools also appears in Shapiro (2001).
2The U.S. history of patent pools started in 1856 with the sewing-machine pool. The assessment of patent
pools under antitrust law has changed dramatically over time. These past changes are well documented by
legal scholars, who interpret them as a consequence of a fundamental opposition between patent laws (which
protect inventors from competition in the sale of goods covered by patents), and antitrust laws (which promote
competition). On this see Andewelt (1984) and Kaplow (1984). For other detailed comments that consider the
most recent cases of pool formation in high technology sectors, see Merges (1999) and Newberg (2000). For
thorough economic analyzes of the history of patent pools under antitrust laws, see Carlson (1999) and Gilbert
(2002). The European context is also discussed in Colangelo (2004) and Gilbert (2004).
3The patents that cover two innovations are complementary if both innovations are required to produce a given
output. License agreements induce transaction costs as patentees and licensees use resources to identify relevant
patents, negotiate royalties, or enforce property rights. A patent is blocking another patent if the latter may not
be practiced without using the former. A patent infringement occurs when a patent is used in the absence of
authorization by the patent holder.
1We can identify two possible research viewpoints on questions concerning patent pooling,
namely the ex ante perspective and the ex post perspective.
We adopt the ex ante perspective to identify the basic trade-oﬀs that determine the dynamic
incentives to perform R&D. Our starting point is that ﬁrms consider the possibility of participat-
ing in a patent pool in their private valuation of R&D programs. The pooling of patents allows
the ﬁrms to coordinate their licensing behavior and increases their return on investment. This
has an impact on their investment decisions provided ﬁrms are rational enough to anticipate the
formation of the pool.
Although legal scholars and business practitioners have documented particularities of all
kinds in clinical analyzes of patent pools, a few stylized features characterize recent arrange-
ments:4 (i) they are based on an industry standard which has been designed at the industry
level in advance of the formation of the pool;5 (ii) they form at the issue of a voluntary process
in which patentees request a clearance statement from the regulator by submitting a pool pro-
posal;6 (iii) they establish a mechanism for dividing among patentees the royalty stream;7 (iv)
4See Merges (1999) for a detailed description of the many organizational forms and contractual provisions of
past and current pooling arrangements.
5Kulbaski (2002) documents the idea that the preliminary delineation of a standard constitutes a technologi-
cally grounded device for the determination of the patents to be subsequently included in a pool. Examples include
the second Moving Picture Experts Group (MPEG-2) pool, which was formed in 1997, following a proposition
to the DoJ by eight electronics ﬁrms and Columbia University. It concerned a video data storage compression
standard established in 1994. The ﬁrst Digital Versatile Discs (DVD) pool was cleared in 1998, and proposed by
three ﬁrms. The second DVD pool was cleared in 1999, and proposed by six ﬁrms. The so-called DVD-3C and
DVD-6C pools comply with the same two related standards for the production of digital supports and players
that were deﬁn e di n1 9 9 6 .T h e3 r dG e n e r a t i o n( 3 G )m o b i l ep a t e nt pool was cleared in 2002, after a proposition
issued by nineteen telecommunications companies. It is based on a standard deﬁned in 1999. In the absence of
standard, the formation of patent pools is more controversial, as exempliﬁed by the current debate concerning
their development in the biotechnology industry. See Grassler and Capria (2003) for arguments in favour of pools
and Seide, and Lecointe and Granovsky (2001) for arguments against their use, in this sector.
6On this see the four U.S. Department of Justice Business Review Letters (1997, 1998, 1999 and 2002, available
at: www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/busreview/1170.htm) regarding MPEG-2, the two DVD pools, and the 3G platform,
respectively.
7For example, in the MPEG-2 case, the pool initiators licensed their patents to MPEG LA, a licensing agent.
This separate entity oﬀers the portfolio of patents as a package to third parties (although any particular patent
may be licensed from a pool member individually). Royalties are then distributed according to a formula which
reﬂects the respective weight of patent contributors to the pool. On this see Merges (1999, p. 28-31).
2they evolve over time to incorporate the innovations that are patented after pool creation.8
We develop a tractable dynamic model of pool formation that incorporates these features
and study some of the consequences of the pool formation mechanism on the speed of innovation.
By contrast, the ex post perspective follows antitrust practices for reviewing the impact of
a pool on welfare after the formation of that pool. The objective is then to identify what kind
of pools should be authorized by the regulator, a question that is examined by Shapiro (2001).
In this pioneering contribution, a very simple model lends theoretical support to the prevalent
view that welfare is harmed when patents are perfect substitutes, and raised when patents are
perfect complements. However, it is not always obvious that given patents are substitutes or
complements. In that case, a relevant objective is to provide the regulator with some means
to discriminate among pool candidates. Lerner and Tirole (2003) address this problem in a
model that describes the full range between the extreme cases of perfectly substitutable and
perfectly complementary patents. In this more general context, they notably show that the
requirement that independent licenses be oﬀered by pool members to third parties can be used
as a screening device. The reason is roughly that independent licensing is innocuous when
patents are complements, but reduces the pool’s proﬁt when patents are substitutes. Compulsory
independent licensing thus lowers the incentive to pooling substitutable patents. In a companion
paper, Lerner, Strojwas, and Tirole (2003) obtain empirical ﬁndings that are consistent with
this theoretical result. Brenner (2004) extends the Lerner-Tirole setup to include a static (i.e.
post innovation) modelling of the non-cooperative process of pool formation.
8The United States Patent and Trademark Oﬃce (2000) documents the fact that, in recent cases, the Depart-
ment of Justice has not only focused on the complementary nature of existing patents to be licensed at the date
of pool formation, but also required that participants license to each other complementary patents “they obtain
in the future” (p. 7, original emphasis). Moreover, new patents in the pool do not necessarily originate from the
pool initiators. For example, after 1997, the MPEG-2 pool grew by including additional patents from a set of
ﬁrms which did not participate in the foundation of the pool, including France Telecom, Hitachi, and JVC.
3In other words, the problem of interest in the ex post perspective is to assess the potential
impact of a proposed arrangement among patent holders on the functioning of the market in
subsequent periods. The objective is to clear pools that will not raise more antitrust concerns
than in the absence of pool. By contrast, what is at stake in the ex ante perspective is the
magnitude of ﬁrms’ incentives to invest in R&D as enhanced by the looming possibility to
participate in the formation of a pool. A central issue thus consists in identifying the forces at
work in a patent pool review process.
W eb e l i e v et h a ta nex ante perspective for analyzing patent pools is important because it
takes into account the speciﬁc nature of patents. Unlike standard goods, patents exist for their
incentive properties. Every manipulation of the value of patents has an impact on these proper-
ties and may change substantially the usefulness of patents as a means to encourage R&D. In our
analysis, we evacuate the antitrust concerns of all kinds by assuming that potential requirements
by the antitrust authority are satisﬁed. We assume that all patents are complementary, pool
members may license their inventions separately, and new patents may integrate the pool.9 We
also limit the potential strategic externalities to concentrate on the proﬁt enhancing property
of pools. The value of a patent in a pool is supposed not to depend on the size of the pool.
Similarly, the value of a patent outside the pool is supposed not to depend on the existence nor
on the size of the pool. This allows us to analyze the impact of the formation of a pool, as well
as the impact of the date of formation of this pool, on the speed of innovation.
We ﬁnd that, compared to the situation where there is no possible pooling, the perspective
of a pool enhances the speed of R&D. More interestingly, we show that because ﬁrms value more
9These features were identiﬁed by considering four recent Departement of Justice Business Review Letters,
that reveal antitrust enforcement intentions with respect to the formation of particular arrangements, namely the
MPEG and two DVD pools in the information technology industry, and the 3G partnership in the mobile phone
industry. The letters are responses to pool initiators which request a statement of the Department of Justice’s
antitrust enforcement intentions.
4being among the initial contributors to the pool — as opposed to innovating after the formation
of the pool and then negotiating entry — the equilibrium pattern of innovative eﬀorts is upward
sloping before the formation of the pool. Eventually, we study the impact of the timing of the
regulator’s review process of patent proposals on the level of R&D eﬀorts and resulting welfare.
This is done by describing the pool review as a sequential process in which the industry ﬁrst
proposes a set of patents, to which the regulator responds either by accepting the proposition
or by imposing another set of patents. We ﬁnd that this process may induce overinvestment in
early innovations from the industry’s point of view. It may also induce ineﬃciencies according
to a social welfare criterion in the sense that the equilibrium number of patents generally falls
short of the welfare maximization value.
Our analysis of patent pooling bears some resemblance with the standard literature on the
ex ante study of patenting as exempliﬁed by Reinganum (1989) or Grossman and Shapiro (1987)
for instance. In both settings, incentives to innovate are provided by a “prize” in case of success.
However, whereas the monopoly power associated to a patent is costly to the regulator, the
f o r m a t i o no fap a t e n tp o o lc a nb eb e n e ﬁcial even from a purely ex post point of view because
it facilitates the diﬀusion of the innovations. This diﬀerence has some consequences for welfare
analysis.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 builds a model of pool formation in the terms of a
diﬀerential game. Section 3 oﬀers a characterization of the Symmetric Markov Perfect Equilibria
of the game. Section 4 is an analysis of the impact of the size of the pool on the incentives
to invest in R&D and on the speed of innovation. Section 5 compares the equilibrium R&D
investment choices with joint proﬁt-maximizing levels and discusses the welfare implications of
the pool review process. Section 6 is a conclusion. All proofs can be found in the Appendix.
52T h e P a t e n t R a c e G a m e
We consider an industry of N of symmetric ﬁrms. Each of them can obtain exactly one innovation
by investing in a speciﬁc R&D program. When it innovates, a ﬁrm is granted a patent of inﬁnite
length and thereby can secure a given ﬂow of proﬁt v (say, by licensing the innovation), which
does not depend on the existence of other patents nor on their inclusion in a pool. Investment
in an R&D program is a continuous time proﬁt-maximization decision problem. At each point
in time, each ﬁrm i can decide independently to exert a non-negative R&D eﬀort xi
t at some
cost c(xi
t), which is such that c(0) = 0, c0(xi
t) > 0,a n dc00(xi
t) > 0. We also assume that
c0(0) = 0 and c0(+∞)=+ ∞,f o raﬁr m ’ so p t i m a lc h o i c eo fe ﬀort to be an interior solution of
the corresponding program. Innovation is described by a Poisson process and xi
t is normalized
to be ﬁrm i’s instantaneous probability of success.10
We denote by K<Nthe minimal number of R&D programs that were identiﬁed, in a
previous period, and at the industry level, as sources of complementary innovations which, taken
together, can constitute a pool candidate. It can be the outcome of all kinds of considerations, in
which technological determinants have some role.11 Henceforth we shall refer to K as the initial
pool size. This initial size of the pool is the one anticipated by all ﬁrms in the industry and
results from the equilibrium of a sequential game between the industry and the relevant antitrust
authority. We shall assume that K is a parameter and postpone to section 5 the analysis of its
determination.
10The Poisson assumption implies that there is no accumulation of knowledge, see Reinganum (1989).
11The role of technological speciﬁcations or constraints is likely to be prominent in the construction of pools
which are based on an industry standard. Most patent pools currently in existence fall in this category, including
MPEG-2, the two DVD proposals, and 3G. For a detailed and recent account of technological determinants in
the formation of patent pools, see Gilbert (2002).
6W h e nap o o lf o r m s ,t h eﬂow of proﬁt is denoted by ¯ v if the patent is in the pool, with
v ≤ ¯ v. (1)
This inequality says that a pool increases the private value of the patents (say, because it
coordinates the diﬀusion of a standard).12 Patent pooling is a cooperative agreement, which
establishes the rules according to which pool proﬁts are shared among individual ﬁrms. We
assume that, once the pool is created, it has full bargaining power when it negotiates with
potential entrants, and that all resulting proﬁts are shared equally among pool initiators. As
the pool cannot commit to reward new inventors more than their reservation proﬁt, a ﬁrm that
contemplates integrating an existing pool can only expect a ﬂow of proﬁt v from its patent.
The important qualitative feature we want to capture through the latter speciﬁcation is that a
patentee would rather be in the set of pool initiators than become an incremental contributor
obliged to negotiate its entry in an existing pool.13
These simplifying assumptions are made to keep the model tractable and nevertheless allow
us to study the dynamic incentives to perform R&D. To do that, in the following paragraphs we
ﬁrst examine the no-pool benchmark case. Then we establish the actualized value of the patents
owned by the pool initiators and by outsiders, before describing a recursive formulation of the
race to pool creation.
The No-Pool Benchmark Case Suppose that no patent pool may be formed. Since R&D
programs are independent of one another, the environment is non-strategic and we can analyze
any ﬁrm’s decision by studying the optimal pattern of investment for a single representative
12Note that v and ¯ v do not to depend on the size of the pool. However, as we shall see, the actualized value of
participating in a pool does depend on N and K.
13For a formal analysis of situations in which a ﬁrm ﬁnds it proﬁtable not to join an existing pool, see Aoki
and Nagaoka (2004).
7ﬁrm. The maximum value function V of the ﬁrm’s program depends on the innovation state,
which can take values 0 or 1. In case of success, or state 1, the actualized value of a patent is
V (1) = v/r,w h e r er is the common interest rate. In the absence of innovation, or state 0,t h e
actualized value V (0) of the ﬁrm’s R&D program veriﬁes
rV(0) = max
x
[x(V (1) − V (0)) − c(x)]. (2)
In the usual terminology, the latter Bellman equation says that the return r on the “asset” V (0)
is equal to the expected “capital gains” x(V (1)−V (0)) minus the ﬂow of “dividends” c(x).T h e
ﬁrst-order condition for an optimal level of eﬀort implies that
V (0) = v/r − c0 (x), (3)
where x is solution to
v − (x + r)c0 (x)+c(x)=0 , (4)
as obtained by plugging (3) into (2).
The Formation of the Pool Suppose that a patent pool may be formed by K patents.
Then the pool initiators are the K ﬁrst patentees, which thereby gain two kinds of beneﬁts.
First, they make a higher return on their own patent, that is ¯ v, than in the benchmark case. In
addition, they extract some rent, that is a ﬂow of proﬁt ¯ v − v, from any subsequent innovator
interested in entering the pool. If we denote by VK(1) the actualized value of being entitled with









¯ v − v
r
. (5)
The interpretation of the right-hand side of (5) is rather simple. The ﬁrst term is the actualized
value of a patent that forms the pool and brings a ﬂow of proﬁte q u a lt o¯ v. The second term
8reﬂects the fact that each of the potential N − K subsequent entrants contributes to the total
pool value by a ﬂow of rent equal to ¯ v−v.T h et o t a lﬂow is actualized (divided by r), discounted
by the “adjusted probability” of success of the R&D programs
x
x+r, and equally divided among
the K pool initiators.14 Remark that, after the formation of the pool, the R&D decisions of all
outsiders — the ﬁrms which have not patented yet and thus do not participate in the pool — are
the same as in the no-pool benchmark case. Each of them invests x, that is the solution to (4),
and the actualized value of each R&D program is as displayed in (3), that is
VK+1 (0) = v/r − c0(x). (6)
In other words, (6) is the value of not being among the K ﬁrst patent holders.
A Recursive Formulation of the Race to the Pool We now concentrate on the period
starting at date 0 and ﬁnishing with the formation of the pool. This period is analogous to a
race in which the prize consists in being among the K ﬁrst innovators, as this gives access to
a portion of the pool value. Equivalently, we choose to describe it hereafter as a series of K
successive patent races. The environment is now strategic because each ﬁrm’s expected return
from a patent depends on the achievement of other ﬁrms to be among the K ﬁrst patentees,
and thus on their respective investments. This implies that the maximum value of a ﬁrm’s R&D
program is function not only of the innovation state (i.e., to be successful of not), but also of
the existence of a subset of ﬁrms which patented an innovation. As we assume that choices
in R&D investments depend only on a current value relevant state, and ﬁrms are identical,
14When the length of one period goes to inﬁnity, the probability of success of the R&D program goes to 1.
However, time is costly and from the expected proﬁt expression we can derive an “adjusted probability” of success.
Suppose that the stationary investment of the ﬁrm is x and the size of the reward in case of success is Π.T h e n










In words, everything happens as if by investing x the ﬁrm were instantaneously successful with probability
x
x+r.
9we restrict attention to Symmetric Markov Perfect Equilibria. Note that symmetry makes the
identity of race participants irrelevant for the expression of gains in any state. Value functions
c a nt h u sb ei n d e x e do n l yb yt h en u m b e ro fﬁrms that have already patented an innovation or,
equivalently, by the rank k of the patent race in which a ﬁrm participates, with k ≤ N.F o r m a l l y ,
by generalizing previous notation, we denote by Vk(0) the actualized value of a research program
that aims at discovering the k-th innovation (when there exist k − 1 patentees), and by Vk(1)
the actualized value of patenting in the k- t hr a c e( i nw h i c hc a s et h e r ea r ek patentees).
When exactly k −1 ﬁrms have patented an innovation, N −k +1other ﬁrms keep investing
in an R&D program. Let us concentrate on one of these ﬁrms, we label i, in order to compute
its equilibrium strategy xi.F i r m i’s R&D program can either be successful before others and
thus lead to an innovation of value Vk(1),o rf a i li np a t e n t i n gt h ek-th innovation and be valued




x(Vk(1) − Vk(0)) + Xj(Vk+1(0) − Vk(0)) − c(x)
¤
, (7)
where Xj is the sum of the instantaneous R&D eﬀorts made by all other participating ﬁrms
j 6= i. In words, the latter displayed expression equates the return on the “asset” Vk(0) to the
expected “capital gains” minus “dividends”. In contrast to the no-pool benchmark case, here
capital gains can take two forms, depending on whether ﬁrm i innovates ﬁrst or another ﬁrm j




c0¢−1 (Vk(1) − Vk(0)). (8)
Recalling that a ﬁrm can perform only one innovation, hence all patent holders stop investing,
15When a ﬁrm participates in some race k and does not succeed in being the ﬁrst to discover an innovation, it
initiates a new R&D program of rank k +1 . Accordingly, the actualized value of a program that fails to patent
the k- t hi n n o v a t i o nc a nb ed e n o t eb yVk+1(0).F o rk = N, we adopt the notational convention that VN+1(0) = 0.
10we use the symmetry assumption to write xi
k = xk for all i and then transform (7) into
rVk(0) = xkc0(xk)+( N − k)xk(Vk+1(0) − Vk(0)) − c(xk). (9)
Finally, to characterize completely the value function associated with this game, we must
compute the value of patenting in the k-th race, that is Vk(1). This is done by observing that
during the k +1 -th race, that is in the period that follows the discovery of the k-th innovation,
and before the discovery of another innovation, each of the k patentees receives a ﬂow of proﬁt
equal to v. In the same period, the event that one of the “remaining” N − k ﬁrms succeeds in
patenting an innovation can occur with an “adjusted probability” of success of
(N−k)xk+1
r+(N−k)xk+1,i n
which case the actualized value of all patents at the issue of the race is equal to the value of
innovating at rank k +1 ,t h a ti sVk+1(1). Otherwise, all R&D programs fail with probability
r







+( N − k)xk+1Vk+1(1)
r +( N − k)xk+1
. (10)




r+(N−k)xk+1,o rVk+1(1) with probability
(N−k)xk+1
r+(N−k)xk+1.
3 Equilibrium Pattern of R&D Eﬀorts
In this section we characterize the Symmetric Markov Perfect Equilibria of the K races. The
t w om a i np r o p e r t i e sw eo b t a i ni naﬁrst proposition are that equilibrium R&D eﬀorts (as made
by ﬁrms that have not innovated yet) are increasing with time as long as the pool is not formed,
and are always greater than the post pool-formation eﬀorts. These basic properties are ob-
tained through a series of lemmas which characterize the solution(s) of the recursive system as
formulated above.
11Lemma 1 For all k<K− 1, we have:
v
r
<V k(1) <V k+1(1).
This says that the value of a patent increases as the rank k gets closer to the pool formation
rank K. Indeed, the reward accruing to a patentee which participates in the formation of the
pool is less discounted in race k +1than at rank k. Moreover, since owning one of the K ﬁrst
patents gives access to a share of the pool’s proﬁts on top of the ﬂow of proﬁts obtained in the
no pool situation, we have Vk(1) >
v
r .
Lemma 2 After the formation of the pool, outsiders’ R&D eﬀorts decrease:
xK >x .
This claim becomes intuitive if one observes that, in the K-th patent race, ﬁrms have a last
chance to participate in the formation of the pool. This perspective encourages them to choose
a more aggressive strategy than in the absence of hope to beneﬁt from the pool’s proﬁts. Exac-
erbated competition in this last race induces a higher eﬀort level than in the post pool-formation
period. The next lemma establishes the monotonicity of equilibrium investment eﬀorts.
Lemma 3 The two following properties are equivalent:
(i) xk <x k+1;
(ii) x <x k.
12By combining the latter statement with Lemma 2, we can now state the main result of this
section.
Proposition 1 Before the formation of the pool, race participants’ R&D eﬀorts increase with
the rank of the race. After the formation of the pool, outsiders’ R&D eﬀorts decrease drastically.
Formally, for all k ≤ K − 1, we have:
x <x k <x k+1.
The information this proposition gives on the equilibrium R&D eﬀort levels of race participants







123... K − 1 K K +1
Figure 1: Pattern of Equilibrium R&D Eﬀort Levels.
13A clear implication of Proposition 1 is that the pooling of patents has a positive impact on
R&D activity. Compared to a situation in which no pool can be formed, the speed of innovation
is higher before the formation of the pool (i.e., xk >x ). By increasing the prospective proﬁts of
a patent, the pool acts as an additional reward, and thus enhances incentives to perform R&D.
This simple result conﬁrms in a formal way the claim by Lerner and Tirole (2003) that “the
prospect of a pool raises individual proﬁt and thereby encourages innovation” (p. 27).
Another consequence of Proposition 1 is that, as the number of patents gets closer to the
pool formation level, successive races become increasingly tougher, inducing the participants to
raise their level of eﬀort. This characterization is rooted in three distinct eﬀects. First, in the
k-th patent race, the number of participants is larger than in the k+1-th race. The access to the
prize, which consists in being among the K ﬁrst innovators, is thus more hazardous at the lower
rank, leading to weaker incentives to invest. Second, if a ﬁrm wins the k-th race, it waits longer
for the formation of the pool than if it succeeds in patenting the k +1 -th innovation. Time
being discounted, the reward is thus smaller in the k-th race. Finally, the failure to innovate is
less damaging in the k- t hr a c et h a ni nt h ek +1 -th race. The reason is that, at the lower rank,
there is one more race to run before the formation of the pool, and thus one additional chance
to be among the K ﬁrst patentees. All these eﬀects contribute to obtaining that xk <x k+1.
Remark that we did not address so far the question of the uniqueness of the solution (8) to the
recursive system. Actually, it is not clear that the Bellman equation (7) has only one solution,
meaning that the diﬀerential game we consider may have several Symmetric Markov Perfect
Equilibria. However, Proposition 1 was proved without relying on uniqueness. This means that
our results are valid for all possible equilibria. In all equilibrium paths, race participants’ R&D
eﬀorts increase over time until pool formation.
14We end this section with a lemma that will be useful for subsequent analysis.
Lemma 4 For all k ≤ K, we have:




In more intuitive terms, this lemma says that the perspective of the formation of a pool increases
the potential value of an innovation, and thus also increases the value of all research programs.
4S i z e E ﬀects
We already know from Proposition 1 that the mere possibility of forming a pool increases the
speed of innovation. In this section we want to analyze the impact of the size of the pool, K,o n
the incentives to invest in R&D, and thus on the speed of innovation. Because the perspective
of a pool acts as a reward on investment, increasing the pool size from K to K should a priori
raise eﬀort levels that aim at patenting in races K to K, all other things remaining equal. We
will see with Proposition 2 that this is not the only impact of an increased pool size, since this
also results in a reduction of eﬀorts in the K ﬁrst races.
As the proof of the results below make use of the uniqueness of the equilibrium solution to
the recursive system, we start by identifying the following mild suﬃcient condition.
Lemma 5 If c000 ≥ 0, then the diﬀerential game has only one Symmetric Markov Perfect Equi-
librium.
From now on, we introduce the additional assumption that c000 ≥ 0.
15B e c a u s ew ew a n tt oc o m p a r et h eS y m m e t r ic Markov Perfect Equilibrium for diﬀerent values
of the pool size, we extend the previous notation by explicitly incorporating K in the arguments
of the value function and the eﬀort level. We now denote by Vk(1,K) (resp. Vk(0,K))t h e
value associated with a patent (resp. a research program) when exactly k innovations (resp.
exactly k − 1 innovations) have been patented, and K patents are needed to form a pool. The
corresponding eﬀort level of the ﬁrms which participate in the k-th patent race is xk(K).
Lemma 6 VK(1,K) is a strictly decreasing function of K.
This claim is derived directly from equation (5), and results from the fact that the value of
participating in the formation of the pool gets lower if the size K increases, since the beneﬁts
will be reduced — there will be less potential entrants from which to extract a rent — and will be












16Figure 2: Comparing Two Pool Sizes.
Proposition 2 For two diﬀerent pool sizes, K < K, the equilibrium patterns of innovative
eﬀort levels verify:
(i) for k ≤ K, xk(K) >x k(K);
(ii) for k>K, xk(K)=xk(K)=x;
(iii) for K <k≤ K, xk(K) >x= xk(K);
(iv) xK(K) >x K(K).
In words, this proposition oﬀers a complete comparison of equilibrium R&D eﬀort patterns as
obtained in the small and large pool cases: (i) establishes that race participants’ R&D eﬀorts
at each rank k in the small size case are higher than in the large size case; (ii) states that the
post pool-formation R&D eﬀorts of outsiders fall at the no-pool optimal level x for all pool sizes
(whereas pool initiators do not invest anymore); eventually, an increase in pool size implies a
prolongation of race participants’ equilibrium R&D eﬀorts, which according to (iii)a r ea b o v e
the no-pool optimal level, and from (iv)a r eb e l o wt h eﬁnal race level of a smaller sized pool.
All results given in Proposition 2 are summarized in Figure 2.
An interesting implication of Proposition 2 is that increasing the minimum size of the pool
dilutes the incentives to obtain the ﬁrst patents, and thus decreases the equilibrium R&D eﬀorts
for the discovery of innovations. This important eﬀect is the consequence of three distinct
factors. First, patenting in the k-th race is more valuable if K is smaller because the discount
applied on the reward is smaller (the waiting time is shorter). Second, the reward itself is higher
for a smaller K because the pool’s proﬁt pie is not only larger but also divided among a smaller
set of ﬁrms. Finally, the larger K, the less damaging a failure in the k-th race, since the number
17of opportunities to belong to the set of pool initiators (that is, the number of subsequent races
K −k), as faced by an unsuccessful ﬁrm, increases with the minimum size of the pool. All three
factors contribute to the claim that, although unsuccessful ﬁrms have an incentive to increase
their R&D eﬀort successively from the ﬁrst to the K-th race, a reduction in the size of the pool
implies higher levels of investment in each race.
5 Pre Pool-Formation Incentives and Welfare Consequences
We can now use the results obtained in the previous sections to point to two distinct sources
of distortions. The ﬁrst one aﬀects private beneﬁts and originates from the pre pool-formation
incentives, which drive ﬁrms’ R&D investment decisions. The second one impacts social welfare
and is rooted in the prospective orientation of the pool review process, as conducted by the
regulator.
Early Overinvestment in Innovation Consider for one moment the overall industry
acting as a single player and assume that this player has control over the rank K and the vector
x =(x1,x 2,...,x N) of investment levels chosen by all ﬁrms. This player will maximize the joint
proﬁts of the innovative ﬁrms. As the eﬀect of the pool formation is to increase the value of the
innovations (from v to v), a simple revealed preference argument leads to the conclusion that
it cannot be worse oﬀ by choosing K =1than any other pool size.16 The proﬁt accruing to
the industry for each innovation is then v/r and the optimal investment level in each project is
then x such that v − (x + r)c0(x)+c(x)=0 .A sc(.) is convex and v ≥ v,w eh a v ex ≥ x.T h i s
investment level is also the one chosen independently by ﬁrms involved in an R&D program with
16The fact that one patent is suﬃcient to form a pool is one of our modelling assumptions and may be surprising.
Actually, one can consider that two (or more) patents are needed to form a pool, it will not challenge the validity
of the point made here but will only add computational complexity.
18expected return v, as demonstrated in Section 2. We refer to the choice K =1and the levels
x =( x,...,x) as the joint proﬁt-maximizing strategy of the industry. By using this optimal
strategy as a benchmark for the assessment of ﬁrms’ behavior, we reach the conclusion that a
pool formation process induces ﬁrms to overinvest in early innovations. This occurs because, in
our model, being among the pool initiators is over-rewarded through the extraction of the rent
from ﬁrms which innovate after the formation of the pool. In particular, recall that the private






r , which is strictly greater than v/r
for all K<N . We obtain the following result:
Proposition 3 The race to the patent pool exhibits overinvestment in innovation compared to
the joint proﬁt-maximizing R&D levels. Formally, for all K<N , we have:
xK(K) > x.
It is interesting to link this proposition to the research contributions on multi-stage patent races
which concentrate on the cumulative nature of innovation. This literature is mainly concerned by
the problem of rewarding the early inventors for opening the way to subsequent improvements,
and generally insists on the insuﬃcient incentives given by patent protection. (See Green and
Scotchmer (1995), Chang (1995) or Matutes, Régibeau and Rockett (1996) for representative
contributions.) We ﬁnd that a patent pool can be conceived as a means to increase the rewards
to early inventors, so long as it enhances their bargaining power when time comes to negotiate
the inclusion in the pool of new patents by subsequent innovators. The idea that ﬁrms may
overinvest in R&D prior to the formation of the pool contrasts with the ex post antitrust concern
that ﬁrms may free ride on other pool participants’ discoveries, thereby leading to suboptimal
19R&D investments. This may occur when a pool agreement stipulates the cross-licensing of
present as well as future patents (see the Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual
Property (1995)).
Delayed Formation of the Pool F r o mas o c i a lw e l f a r ep o i n to fv i e w ,t h ep o o lf o r m a t i o n
process may also entail some form of distortion. To see this point, let us consider a measure of
the social welfare SW = SW(x,K). In equilibrium x = x(K), so that the variable K inﬂuences
the measure of social welfare in two ways, directly through its impact on the social value of an
innovation (this comes from the fact that the social value of an innovation may not be the same
whether its corresponding patent is in a pool or not), and indirectly through its impact on the
speed of the R&D process (i.e. the levels of investment). We suppose that the basic problem of
the regulator is to encourage R&D in situations characterized by the following property:
Property 1 ∂SW
∂xi |x≤(x1(1),x2(2),...,xN(N)) > 0, for any i.
When the latter property is veriﬁed, the function SW is assumed to be increasing in xi,o n
the domain relevant for our analysis, that is for all R&D investments that are lower than what
is possibly chosen by any ﬁrm in equilibrium. In our model, this holds true as long as the social
value associated with an innovation is greater than its value for each innovative ﬁrm.
The decision to clear or not the formation of a pool is taken by the competition authorities.
In all recent cases, some negotiation process at the industry level has led to the delineation of
the dimensions of a pool proposal based on a technological standard. In our notational context,
this is captured by the selection of a rank k at which clearance by the regulator is requested.
Then the decision of the regulator to grant clearance to the proposed pool comes as a response.
In this review process, the regulator can impose conditions (i.e., a new size K ≥ k)f o rt h ep o o l
20proposal to be eventually cleared.17 From an ex ante perspective, in our model the socially
optimal choice of K by the regulator is captured by the maximization of SW(x(K),K).T h e n
innovations patented after the formation of the pool, that is from K+1onward, may be included
in the pool.
Suppose ﬁrst that the regulator is consulted by the patent holders at date 0, that is when
no innovation has yet been patented, and that the regulator performs a prospective analysis to
obtain K as a solution to the welfare maximization problem. To compare, suppose now that the
regulator is consulted after date 0, that is when k − 1 innovations have already been obtained
with all ﬁrms anticipating the creation of a pool of K patents, with 1 <k≤ K. Again, let
the regulator perform a prospective analysis to select a pool size K that maximizes the relevant
social welfare function, which in this case writes SW(x1(K),...,x k−1(K),x k(K),...,x N(K),K).
If social welfare increases in each ﬁrm’s R&D investment, this may result in a rise in the minimum
pool size, that is in a choice of K>K .I nt h a tc a s e ,i fﬁrms are suﬃciently rational to anticipate
accurately the formation of the pool, we obtain that K cannot be anticipated by ﬁrms.18 This
reasoning is grounded on the following formal result:
Proposition 4 If Property 1 is veriﬁed, for all k<K< K, we have:
SW(x(K),K) <S W(x1(K),...,x k−1(K),x k(K),...,xN(K),K).
In words, the latter inequality says that the (expectation taken at date 0 of the) social welfare
corresponding to a choice K = K is lower than the (expectation taken at date 0 of the) social
17Recall that in our ex ante approach we evacuate the antitrust concerns about patent substitutability. Our
complementarity assumption implies that it is suboptimal for the regulator to exclude patents from the pool.
18Arguably, the detailed treatment of past cases, as oﬀered by the DoJ Business Review Letters, together with
the related comments by business consultants and lawyers oﬀer suﬃcient guidance for ﬁr m st oa n t i c i p a t et h e
outcome of a pool review process from the outset (for recent examples, see Morse (2002) or Lind et al. (2003)).
21welfare obtained if ﬁrms anticipate K = K during the ﬁrst k − 1 races before realizing that
K = K. This claim is a direct consequence of Proposition 2 (recall that xk(K) <x k(K) for all
k ≤ K < K) and Property 1. In intuitive terms, it says that if the acceptance/refusal decision
concerning a pool proposal is made on a purely prospective basis at date k,i to v e r l o o k st h e
p r ep o o lf o r m a t i o ni n c e n t i v ep r o p e r t i e st h a td r i v eﬁrms’ choices of R&D investments. As a
consequence, even if SW(x(K),K) <S W(x(K),K),i tm a yb et h ec a s et h a tf r o mk onward K
turns out to be the regulator’s best choice. This in turn restricts from below the range of sizes
K that can be anticipated by the pool candidates. As more time is needed to obtain a larger
number of patents, this will tend to delay the acceptance decision more than what would be
optimal from an ex ante perspective. The chosen K may be larger than the K that maximizes
SW(x(K),K).19
This result is consistent with the standard analysis of patents. In the more common situation
of single patent attribution as well, the regulator has fewer motives to award a monopoly power
to an innovator ex post than in the pre innovation period, in which the necessary incentives
to perform R&D are taken into account. However, the case of patent pools is more subtle,
since some of their virtues (to coordinate the launch of a standard, to clear blocking positions,
to reduce transaction costs, to avoid costly infringement litigation), beyond the exercise of
monopoly power, can yield beneﬁts to society also ex post. Consequently, the regulator will not
waver between the options to clear or not to clear the pool, but rather between the options to
clear it now or to clear it later.
19The business professional literature oﬀers anecdotal evidence that a pool review is a timely process. For
example, the 3G pool is based on a standard deﬁned in 1999, but was given clearance in 2002. Swidler Berlin
Shereﬀ Friedman LLP (2003) argue that the pool review process “moved at a glacial pace”, and that “the parties’
i n t e r e s t sw e r eh a r m e db yh a v i n gt ow a i tt h r e ey e a r st og e tas i g n - o ﬀ from the DoJ” (p. 4).
226C o n c l u s i o n
Previous contributions to the emerging IO literature on patent pools have followed antitrust
practice in adopting the ex post perspective for reviewing pool proposals. We have adopted
the ex ante viewpoint to build a tractable dynamic model of multi-stage innovation, leading to
the formation of a pool, and which captures well documented stylized features. The pre pool-
formation situation is described as a series of successive patent races leading to a prize, which
consists in founding the pool, and thereby in gaining access to a portion of the pool value. After
the formation of the pool, late innovators can integrate the pool only by negotiating entry with
the pool initiators.
As a result, the pooling of patents appears to have a positive impact on R&D activity, in
the sense that the speed of innovation is higher before the formation of the pool than compared
to a situation in which no pool can be formed. More precisely, as the number of patents gets
closer to the anticipated pool formation size, it is found that pool candidates raise their level of
eﬀort. A ﬁrm’s investment pattern is thus upward sloping over time before pool formation, and
decreases afterwards.
The analysis oﬀers also a complete comparison of equilibrium R&D eﬀort patterns for two
diﬀerent sizes of patent pools. The main insights are as follows: for a given rank in the innovation
series leading to the pool, a race participants’ R&D investment is higher in the small pool size
case than in the large size case; the post pool-formation R&D investment of outsiders falls at the
no-pool optimal level for all pool sizes; eventually, an increase in pool size implies a prolongation
of race participants’ equilibrium R&D investment below the ﬁnal race level of a smaller sized
pool but above the no-pool optimal level. These results imply that an increase in the number of
innovations which are required to form a pool dilutes ﬁrms’ incentives to obtain the ﬁrst patents,
23and thus decreases the equilibrium R&D investments.
Eventually, our analysis points to two separate sources of distortions. They originate from
the characterization of private incentives as faced by ﬁrms in the pre pool-formation race, and
from the prospective nature of the pool review process as conducted by the regulator. First, we
argue that, if the ﬁrms which innovate after the formation of the pool are not protected enough
against rent extraction by the pool initiators, then an overinvestment in R&D may occur before
the formation of the pool, followed by an underinvestment in all successive periods. This com-
plements the antitrust concern that, in the post pool-formation period, ﬁrms may produce too
little innovation eﬀort by free riding on other pool participants’ discoveries. Moreover, we obtain
that a cost-beneﬁt analysis, as performed by a forward looking regulatory authority, overlooks
the incentive properties of participating in the foundation of a pool, and thus overestimates the
gains of delaying the formation of pools, a source of ineﬃciency.
247 Appendix
7.1 Proofs
P r o o fo fL e m m a1 The proof is immediate since we know from (5) that VK(1) >
v
r ,a n d
from (10) that Vk(1) is a convex combination of
v
r and Vk+1(1). ¤
P r o o fo fL e m m a2 To prove this lemma, remark ﬁrst that the function v−rc0(x)+c(x)−






= −c(xK)+xKc0 (xK)+( N − K)xK
hv
r
− c0(x) − VK(1) + c0(xK)
i
,












+ c0(x) − c0(xK)
i
=0 .
If we suppose that xK <x , then all the terms of this sum are (strictly) positive, which is
impossible. Hence we must have xK >x . ¤
Proof of Lemma 3 Let us start by proving that xk+1 <x k implies xk <x . By rewriting





= xkc0(xk)+( N − k)xk
£
Vk+1(1) − c0(xk+1) − Vk(1) + c0(xk)
¤
− c(xk). (11)
Moreover, we know from (10) that
−(N − k)xk+1 [Vk+1(1) − Vk(1)] + rVk(1) = v,
and Lemma 1 together with xk+1 <x k gives
−(N − k)xk [Vk+1(1) − Vk(1)] + c0(xk) − c0(xk+1)+rVk(1) <v .
25We can now rewrite (11) as
v − (r + xk)c0(xk)+c(xk) > 0,
w h i c hi nt u r ni m p l i e sxk <x . For the other implication, xk <ximplies that −rc0(xk)+c(xk)−
xkc0(xk) > −v =( N − k)xk+1(Vk+1(1) − Vk(1)) − rVk(1), thus from (11) we have





Then Lemma 1 implies that xk+1 <x k must be veriﬁed. ¤
P r o o fo fL e m m a4 Assume that the weak inequality is veriﬁed for k +1 , and suppose
that Vk(0) ≤
v
r − c0(x). Then from (9) we derive that v − rc0(x) ≥− c(xk)+xkc0(xk),w h i c hi s
impossible because xk >x . To conclude the proof, remark that the weak inequality is veriﬁed
at K +1 . ¤
P r o o fo fL e m m a5 Deﬁne the function
F(xk)=rVk(1) − (r + xk)c0(xk)+c(xk) − (N − k)xk
£
Vk+1(1) − c0(xk+1) − Vk(1) + c0(xk)
¤
.
From (10) we obtain F(0) > 0,a n di fc000 ≥ 0 then F00 < 0. Hence there exists only one xk such
that F(xk)=0(which corresponds to a solution of the Bellman equation). By iterating, we
demonstrate that there exists only one symmetric equilibrium path. ¤
Proof of Proposition 2 The points (ii) and (iii) are straightforward. Let us prove point







26and replacing that into equation (11) gives
r
£
Vk (1,K) − c0 (xk (K))
¤
= −c(xk (K)) + xk(K)c0 (xk (K))
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+ v + c(xk(K) − xk(K)c0 (xk(K))
− rc0 (xk(K)) + (N − k)xk(K)
£
c0 (xk+1(K)) − c0 (xk (K))
¤
=0 .
Now suppose that at stage k +1we have Vk+1(1,K) >V k+1(1,K) and xk+1(K) >x k+1(K),
where K>K . Then from equation (10) we deduce that Vk(1,K) >V k(1,K) because in the
K-case, we give more weight to the most valuable point in the convex combination and this
most valuable point is more valuable than in the K-case. From the deﬁnition of F,w ea l s ok n o w
that F(xk(K),K)=0and F(0,K) > 0. Next, we can verify that because xk+1(K) >x k+1(K),
xk+1(K) >x k(K) and Vk(1,K) >V k(1,K) >
v
r ,w eh a v eF(xk(K),K) < 0. But then,
the intermediate value theorem together with the unicity of the Symmetric Markov Perfect
Equilibrium gives xk(K) >x k(K). The only thing that remains to be proved now is that
VK(1,K) >V K(1,K) and xK(K) >x K(K).T h eﬁrst point is a direct consequence of Lemma
1 and Lemma 6. For the second point it is useful to come back to the following expression





The function F deﬁned in this way veriﬁes F(0,K) > 0, F(xk(K),K)=F(xk(K),K)=0 .
Using the fact that VK(1,K) >V K(1,K) and VK+1(0,K) <V K+1(0,K) (which comes from
Lemma 4), we can deduce that F(xk(K),K) < 0. Again, the intermediate value theorem
together with the unicity of the Symmetric Markov Perfect Equilibrium gives xK(K) >x K(K),
as expected.
27Eventually, to prove (iv), consider the function F(x,K)=rVK(1,K) − (r + x)c0(x)+
c(x)−(N −K)x[VK+1(0,K) − VK(1,K)+c0(x)].B yd e ﬁnition F(xK(K),K)=0and we have
F(0,K) > 0.C o n s i d e rK>K , we know from Lemma 6 that VK(1,K) >V K(1,K).M o r e o v e r
VK+1(0,K)=VK+1(0,K) and VK+1(0,K) − VK(1,K)+c0(x) < 0 (Lemma 4). Hence we have
F(xK(K),K) < 0. The intermediate value theorem together with the unicity of the Symmetric
Markov Perfect Equilibrium gives xK(K) <x K(K). This concludes the proof. ¤
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 Suppose xK ≤ x. We know that xK =( c0)−1(VK(1,K) −
VK(0,K)) and as (c0)−1 is increasing and VK(1,K) ≤ v
r, this implies necessarily that VK(0,K) ≥
v
r−c0(x) or rVK(0,K) ≥ xc0(x−c(x). The hypothesis c00 > 0 and the starting assumption xK ≤ x
together give VK(0,K) ≥ xKc0(xK) − c(xK). But this is inconsistent with equation (9) because
VK+1(0,K) <V K(0,K).T h u sxK > x. ¤
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